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protect framework files from apps 

There's a separate open question here of where Teliva should store files
like teliva_editor_state and teliva_editor_buffer. One school of thought
is that apps should never be dropping crud into people's directories. On
the other hand, I'm kinda encouraging people so far to just run apps
from Teliva's directory. Perhaps that makes it ok?
This commit is contained in:
Kartik K. Agaram 2022-03-08 19:20:53 -08:00
parent 2b47f76308
commit 08c49b5a0a
3 changed files with 35 additions and 12 deletions
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6
manual_tests
View File

@ -25,10 +25,8 @@ running app.. shouldn't grow the call stack either.
== security/privacy
program draws over menu -> getch -> Teliva menu is still visible
test/attack.tlv runs without error. See its blurb for details.
TODO protect sensitive teliva files (teliva_edit_buffer, etc.)
should we protect .c sources?
app tries to read/write sensitive teliva files (teliva_edit_buffer, etc.) -> never allowed
TODO should we protect .c sources?
TODO protect against DoS attack filling up disk

15
src/liolib.c
View File

@ -132,10 +132,19 @@ static int io_open (lua_State *L) {
snprintf(buffer, 1020, "io.open(\"%s\", \"%s\")", filename, mode);
append_to_audit_log(L, buffer);
FILE **pf = newfile(L);
if (file_operation_permitted(filename, mode)
/* filenames starting with teliva_tmp_ are always ok */
|| starts_with(filename, "teliva_tmp_"))
/* filenames starting with teliva_tmp_ are always ok */
if (starts_with(filename, "teliva_tmp_")) {
*pf = fopen(filename, mode);
}
/* other filenames starting with teliva_ are never ok (reserved for the
* framework, should not be accessed by apps directly */
else if (starts_with(filename, "teliva_")) {
snprintf(iolib_errbuf, 1024, "app tried to open file '%s'; that's never allowed for filenames starting with 'teliva_'", filename);
Previous_message = iolib_errbuf;
}
else if (file_operation_permitted(filename, mode)) {
*pf = fopen(filename, mode);
}
else {
snprintf(iolib_errbuf, 1024, "app tried to open file '%s'; adjust its permissions (ctrl-p) if that is expected", filename);
Previous_message = iolib_errbuf;

26
src/loslib.c
View File

@ -46,19 +46,35 @@ static char oslib_errbuf[1024] = {0};
static int os_rename (lua_State *L) {
const char *fromname = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
const char *toname = luaL_checkstring(L, 2);
/* A rename is like reading from one file and writing to another file. */
if (!file_operation_permitted(fromname, "r")
&& !starts_with(fromname, "teliva_tmp_")) {
/* Sandboxing {
* A rename is like reading from one file and writing to another file. */
if (starts_with(fromname, "teliva_tmp_")) {
/* continue */
}
else if (starts_with(fromname, "teliva_")) {
snprintf(oslib_errbuf, 1024, "app tried to open file '%s'; that's never allowed for filenames starting with 'teliva_'", fromname);
Previous_message = oslib_errbuf;
return os_pushresult(L, 0, fromname);
}
else if (!file_operation_permitted(fromname, "r")) {
snprintf(oslib_errbuf, 1024, "app tried to open file '%s' for reading; adjust its permissions (ctrl-p) if that is expected", fromname);
Previous_message = oslib_errbuf;
return os_pushresult(L, 0, fromname);
}
if (!file_operation_permitted(toname, "w")
&& !starts_with(fromname, "teliva_tmp_")) {
if (starts_with(toname, "teliva_tmp_")) {
/* continue */
}
else if (starts_with(toname, "teliva_")) {
snprintf(oslib_errbuf, 1024, "app tried to open file '%s'; that's never allowed for filenames starting with 'teliva_'", toname);
Previous_message = oslib_errbuf;
return os_pushresult(L, 0, toname);
}
else if (!file_operation_permitted(toname, "w")) {
snprintf(oslib_errbuf, 1024, "app tried to open file '%s' for writing; adjust its permissions (ctrl-p) if that is expected", toname);
Previous_message = oslib_errbuf;
return os_pushresult(L, 0, toname);
}
/* } */
return os_pushresult(L, rename(fromname, toname) == 0, fromname);
}