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gemini-certificate-validation-demo-1
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Clarify README.

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README.md
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# gemini-certificate-validation-demo-1 # gemini-certificate-validation-demo-1
This is a minimal Gemini client capable of (self-signed) certificate Minimal Gemini client capable of (self-signed) certificate validation
validation using the additional network perspective of a Tor exit node. using the additional network perspective of a Tor exit node.
When the client encounters a new certificate for a host, it makes a TLS
connection to the same host via Tor, in order to obtain its certificate
from a second vantage point. The user is notified on certificate
mismatch or connection failure.
This method should detect any local man-in-the-middle attack When the client encounters a new TLS certificate for a host, it connects
(originating from the same LAN, for instance) and should also provide to that same host via Tor, in order to obtain its certificate from a
protection over a more or less broad area of the Internet, depending on second vantage point. The user is notified on certificate mismatch or
the exit node's position in the network graph and its DNS resolution connection failure.
setup. Any attack will trigger an alert unless it affects both the user
and the exit node (whether it's a BGP hijack, a DNS compromise or
whatever else).
This validation method works best when the exit node is far from the Any MITM attack (whether enabled by BGP hijack, DNS compromise or
user's position. Users may configure Tor to select specific exit nodes whatever else) will trigger an alert unless it affects both the user and
by setting the exit node at the same time. As such, this validation method works
best when the exit node and the user are far apart and are not using the
same DNS resolver.
Users may configure Tor to select specific exit nodes by setting
the [ExitNodes](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#ExitNodes) the [ExitNodes](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#ExitNodes)
and [StrictNodes](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#StrictNodes) and [StrictNodes](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#StrictNodes)
options in their `torrc` file. The `ExitNodes` option accepts options in their `torrc` file. The `ExitNodes` option accepts
@ -29,7 +26,7 @@ ExitNodes {fr}
StrictNodes 1 StrictNodes 1
``` ```
False alarms can be triggered by MITM attacks on the exit node's end. False alarms can be triggered by attacks on the exit node's end.
And, obviously, validation does not work for servers which block Tor. And, obviously, validation does not work for servers which block Tor.
Validated certificates are kept in memory for the duration of the Validated certificates are kept in memory for the duration of the